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THE CHECHENS: Their history

Dave Davies
Wednesday Night at the NIB, Melbourne Trades Hall, 6 October 2004

THE CHECHENS: Their history:Why a small nation has become a recruiting ground for terrorism.

I read an account written by a Russian who had done a stint in the army in Chechnya. He wrote about a Russian army unit which entered an undefended Chechen village, burnt anything that could be set on fire including livestock, fodder and orchards, polluted the well, generally looted it, and killed a boy with a bayonet in the back. He wrote:

"The feeling experienced by all the Chechens, from the youngest to the oldest, was stronger than hate. It was not hatred, because they did not regard those Russian dogs as human beings; but it was such repulsion, disgust and perplexity at the senseless cruelty of these creatures, that the desire to exterminate them - like the desire to exterminate rats, poisonous spiders, or wolves - was as natural an instinct as that of self-preservation."

These words were written in 1904, and were based on an experience in 1851. The writer's name was Leo Tolstoy, the great Russian writer and author of War and Peace.

The saddest thing is that that experience, and those words, could have been dated as yesterday.

Allow me to move on to a personal note by explaining why I have taken an interest in the Chechens. In 1960, I was a member of the Communist Party of Australia and was invited to study in Moscow in the USSR. I was able to speak Russian, and travelled to a number of parts of the USSR including the Caucasus. I made a lot of friends - and became a critic of the Soviet system - albeit too slowly.

Among the people I met in Moscow were some Chechens. I have never forgotten them, and have tried since to keep up with events in that part of the world and learn more about their history.

Up to a few years ago, very few people had heard of the Chechens. Over the years, there were only minor reports in our media.

The Chechens got on the front page in October 2002 when terrorists held hostages in a Moscow theatre, the affair ending when a nerve gas was pumped in, and the theatre was stormed by Russian troops. 129 hostages and 41 terrorists were killed.

In February this year, an explosion in the Moscow Metro killed about 30 people.

At about this time, Chechnya was linked with Australia when it was reported that the alleged terrorist Willi Brigitte, who had been in Australia, had been working with a Chechen bomb expert. (Of course, I don't know if this is true.)

In August 2004, two Russian passenger planes were blown up on the same day, and 89 people were killed. A few days later, a female suicide bomber killed 10 people at a Moscow Metro station.

However, it was the Beslan school siege which really brought the Chechen issue to our TV screens and front pages with images that horrified us all. It is far from my aim to minimize the horror we felt at this event - but at the same time I wish to assure you that there have been plenty more events which should also have horrified us - but for various reasons did not get into our lounge rooms via the TV.

I want to say at this point that I do not condone or justify terrorism. However, I think it is vital that we try to explain the existence of terrorism, to ask and answer the questions as to why some people use it as a means to an end.

If we do not do this, then we cannot be effective in eliminating terror from the world, and in addition, we leave unanswered and intact the current assumptions and prejudices that terrorism is inherent in some peoples, cultures and religions and that the only way to end terrorism is to "kill the bastards".

I also want to say that in my opinion, there are a number of sources of terrorism and a number of environments in which the use of terror is nourished. Our conclusions about the Chechens do not necessarily answer questions about others who may use terror.

Who, then, are the Chechens? Where do they come from? What is their history?

(A map of the Caucasus between the Black and Caspian Seas was displayed, and reference made to geographical features, such as rugged mountains, steep valleys, narrow passes and thick forests which made things difficult for invaders. Reference was also made to the number of nationalities in this area, the complexity of their relationships, the number of invaders over many centuries, including Arabs, Persians, Ottomans, Alexander the Great, Mongol-Tartars ... and Russians. Other Great Powers, e.g. Britain have poked their noses in at times.)

Since the Transcaucasian Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent in 1991, the spine of the Caucasus Range, including the southern border of Chechnya, has constituted the southern border of the Russian Federation.

The Chechens (indicate on map) have been there at least 6,000 years. They speak a language in the Nakh-Daghestani group of languages, indigenous to the Caucasus.

The name "Chechen" was coined by Russians. It comes from the name of a village. They call themselves Nokhchi and their land Ichkeria, but I will stick to "Chechens".

Their social structure was traditionally patriarchal, based on clans, with no centralized state structure, e.g. no army as such. They followed "adat", or traditional law. This included blood feuds, hospitality, respect for elders. A high value was placed on horsemanship, bravery, skill in combat.

They were able to resist nearly all invaders, partly due to the terrain and the nature of their society. At various stages they acquired horses and firearms. Between the 17th and early 19th centuries, they converted to Islam, but in my estimation they were not very devout, but moderate. Traditional law and customs, including consumption of alcohol, remained to a considerable extent.

Russian conquest of the Caucasus began in the late 1500s and was "complete" by mid-1800s - "complete" except for continuing resistance which has lasted to this day.

Why go back so far in history? Because many of the same issues still exist. Karl Marx wrote: "The traditions of all the dead generations weigh like an alp on the brain of the living."

Events and trends seem to repeat themselves. For example one trend is that the Chechens have stuck together in a remarkable way - but on the other hand, there have been some who became part of the Russian imperial establishment.

There were two big resistance movements on the part of the Caucasian mountain people: the first was led by Sheik Mansur. He achieved a 1784 victory, but was captured in 1791.

Most notable was the resistance movement of Imam Shamil, an Avar. This movement included many nationalities of Daghestan and north Caucasus in a 30 years uprising 1830-60, with reverberations to this day.

For example, the Chechen capital Grozny was established as a fort. It is Russian for "threatening" or "terrible" as in Ivan the Terrible. The tsarist General Yermolov was credited with the statement "The only good Chechen is a dead one" long before the American General Sheridan said the same thing about the "injuns". His statue stood in Grozny until about 1994.

The tsarist authorities used the Cossacks to help suppress small nationalities on their borders. The Cossacks were originally Russians and Ukrainians who had fled serfdom and lived in border territories. They were granted "privileges" in exchange for acting as border protectors.

The great Russian writers Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy wrote about the Caucasus, (The latter two served there as soldiers) and their works have become part of Russian culture.

An oft-quoted poem by Lermontov is entitled "A Cossack Lullaby", and one verse reads as follows: (My prose translation).

"Over the rocks the Terek streams/Raising a turbid wave/The evil Chechen climbs the bank/Sharpening his dagger/But your father is a veteran warrior/Hardened in battle/Sleep my child, have no fear/Lullaby."

One form of Chechen resistance to invaders was through the "abreks". It is hard to translate this word, although our "bushranger" comes close. Russians often use the equivalent of the word "bandit", and the word "rebel" also applies. There is quite a bit of controversy over the origin and role of bandits or bushrangers - some regard them simply as criminals, while others such as the rural poor tend to have at least some sympathy for them. (The Victorian cricket team call themselves the Bushrangers).

Soviet historians had difficulty in coping with the role of the abreks in resisting Russian rule. For example, a translator's note in a Soviet edition of Tolstoy's "The Cossacks" reads: "Abreks: Hostile Chechens who crossed over to the Russian bank of the Terek to thieve and plunder. - Tr."

By contrast, Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language (1960) reads: "Abrek: In the period of the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia: a mountaineer, participating in the struggle against the tsarist administration and the Russian armed forces." (My translation).

On the other hand, some Chechens became integrated into Russian ruling circles, e.g. the sons of Shamil.

The economic dimensions of the Chechen lands include fertile plains in north, a small oil deposit, a refinery, some minerals, and an oil pipeline from the Caspian fields. At one time, the Grozny refinery accounted for some 90% of Russian aviation fuel.

During the turbulent years of Revolution and Civil War after 1917, many Chechens sided with the Bolsheviks in hope of gaining independence. They achieved certain things early on, e.g. in 1921, a Soviet Socialist Autonomous Mountain Republic consisting of a number of N. Caucasian nationalities, where Soviet sovereignty was recognized, but there was home responsibility for domestic affairs and religion. But disappointment followed as much of this was eroded, as Stalin (and some of his Caucasian cadres) acted more and more like the tsars - or worse.

The collectivisation of 1929 and Purges of 1936-38 had extremely negative consequences as elsewhere.

There was sporadic resistance through the 1920s and 1930s. Commissars from the Soviet government were often killed and their bodies sent to Moscow.

The biggest single catastrophe for the Chechen people came in February 1944. In a remarkable operation the NKVD rounded up all Chechens without any distinction as to gender, age or political allegiance, loaded them into trucks and thence rail freight cars, and deported them to Central Asia. (Very few escaped the deportation, and many of them were shot on sight.) Estimates vary as to the number who perished en route, but it was possibly half, probably between a quarter and a third. They were not taken to extermination camps, but it was hoped that those who survived would eventually cease to be Chechens, and be absorbed into local populations.

It was a pretty good attempt at cultural genocide, defended by Stalin and his apologists on the grounds of alleged Chechen treachery during the war against Hitler. (Six other nationalities suffered a similar deportation - the Ingush, Balkars, Karachai, Kalmyks, Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars.)

In the harsh conditions of exile, the refractory Chechens refused to die as a people. They maintained their language and, to an extent, their culture.

Note that this happened in 1944, and the exile lasted until 1957. Imagine the feelings of these people! The resentment, passed on to future generations.

I used the word "refractory". They were pretty tough. For instance, many people have now published their accounts of life in the Gulags, the Stalinist prison camps. A number have remarked on the way in which people of various nationalities stuck together in the camps and, apparently, none more than the Chechens. In some accounts, when a group of Chechens was moved into a camp barracks, they would toss other prisoners' bedding etc. on the floor and occupy strategically placed bunks to stay together. On one hand, this helped them to survive but did not make a lot of friends.

This was not just in the prison camps. Many accounts of the exile tell how the Chechens, left to fend for themselves in a desolate landscape, often resorted to "bushranging" - a return to the abreks - to live. It would seem that the Chechens were more "refractory" than the other exiled nationalities.

In 1956, three years after Stalin's death, Khrushchov denounced the deportation of the Chechens and some other nationalities, and about a year later began to allow some to return to their homelands. Unfortunately the return did not go smoothly. Once some were allowed to return, many others packed up for home. However, their lands had been allotted to others, mainly Russians and some Ukrainians, and they were not too happy - indeed there was considerable violence.

I was in the USSR in 1960-61 and met some Chechens.

In keeping with the generally inconsistent and even contradictory nature of Khrushchov's government, there were some genuine attempts at reconciliation and rehabilitation, but they were hampered by the resentment on the part of some Russians and by resistance to Chechen rights by important sections of the bureaucracy. I talked to people who thought it was most important that there be a reconciliation. I thought the signs were good.

On the other hand, there was no public acknowledgement of the wrongs done - Khrushchov's speech in 1956 to the Party Congress in which he denounced some of Stalin's crimes was supposed to be secret; it was not published in the USSR. There was no equivalent of a truth commission as in South Africa. It was not until Gorbachov's govt. in the mid-1980s that there was any public discussion of the Chechen issue.

Soviet statistics indicated that there were 419,000 Chechens in 1959, and nearly a million by 1989.

Tensions persisted under the surface during the long years of Brezhnev and stagnation, that is, from 1964 until Gorbachov in 1985. Outright repression was nowhere near as great as under Stalin - but it was stifling. The fact that nationalism had festered under the surface became clear when the USSR collapsed and all hell broke loose.

However, some Chechens achieved relatively high status in the Soviet Communist Party, the government and the military, (e.g. Khasbulatov, Dudayev) but their attitude to independence and its achievement were far from uniform when perestroika was to lift the lid and release all kinds of pent-up pressures.

The attempted putsch in Russia in 1991 added to the chaos, with Chechen leaders divided in their attitude.

Then, in 1991, the USSR collapsed and a real hurly-burly developed. Two of the things happening were that former Soviet republics were declaring independence, and, on the other hand, Russian nationalism was rising - with a demagogic attitude of some Russian leaders.

At this time, Chechnya, which was, during the time of the USSR, part of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, declared independence (and, by the way, broke with the Ingush).

An uneasy situation prevailed from 1992-94, with the exercise of largely de facto autonomy in the Chechen lands. However, it was unstable. The President was Dzokhar Dudayev, a former Air Force General in Estonia.

The context for these more recent events is also important. The collapse of the USSR brought many problems, including internal wars/conflict (e.g. In Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) corruption, economic problems, decline in living standards for majority of people, polarization of wealth.

At the same time, leading figures among the Chechens (some of whom had been part of the Soviet bureaucracy) lacked experience in managing an economy and appeared erratic. Divisions appeared, sometimes based on clan loyalty, often based on Russian-sponsored opposition forces. Supporters of Chechen independence in Russia and elsewhere were often at the same time critical of the way things were going in Chechnya.

There was an increase in crime rates, corruption and economic problems. Again, they did not have them on their own. One element was the recruitment of some of the more alienated Chechens into Russian criminal gangs. (This was exaggerated by Russian nationalists). Many Chechens had been trained in the use of arms when conscripted into the Soviet army, and in some cases arms and ammunition were acquired by raids and, in many cases, were bought from corrupt army officers or from Russian soldiers who were not getting paid.

Up to 25% of population of Chechnya were Russians, largely urban, in the oil industry and many began leaving.

Towards the end of 1994 and through 1995, outright warfare escalated within Chechnya. At first, mostly Russian-armed opposition forces were involved, but a full-scale invasion took place in December 1994, with leading members of the Russian government and military confident of a quick victory and an end to any idea of Chechen independence.

There were terrible losses, mainly civilians. Ancient methods of resistance by the Chechens were now bolstered by modern military training and experience (e.g. in Afghanistan) and recently acquired weapons. On the other hand, weaponry such as helicopter gunships changed the nature of war in the mountains, with the narrow ravines and passes not so impenetrable as in previous conflicts.

Losses? Between 1994 and 1996, tens of thousands of people were killed in Chechnya. One estimate is that forty-five thousand people died. Of these, it is estimated that only three thousand were soldiers. Many were Russian citizens of Grozny. Other estimates go as high as 100,000 - in fact Yeltsin is quoted as giving this figure.

Let us reflect on this. How much publicity did it get in our media? Compare it with the publicity given to other events.

Do we excuse terrorists if they are wearing uniforms? Do we overlook crimes like this if we are trying to get the perpetrators on our side?


In 1995 there were some attempts at a cease fire, but there were divisions on both sides, e.g. between Yeltsin and the army. They, in turn, claimed that the two Chechen commanders, Dudayev and Maskhadov, had no centralised control, particularly of the man they had long ago labelled a terrorist, Shamil Basayev. While Basayev was still at large, claimed the Russians, there would be no peace talks.

In August 1996, a pact was signed in Khasavyurt in Daghestan between Russian General Alexander Lebed and Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov. It was a cease fire, but the real issue of independence was put off for five years. The situation remained tense and difficult. The Chechens were isolated, law and order were pretty poor with banditry and kidnapping on the increase, and extremist Islamists stepped up their activities. It is no wonder that they had a ready audience.

However, in January 1997, Maskhadov was elected President.

Then in August 1999, things heated up again. Several events occurred.

1. Shamil Basayev, one of the leading military figures of the first war, and Saudi (?) born Khattab conducted a raid into neighbouring Daghestan, capturing a few villages. This was evidently carried out without approval of other Chechen leaders. Some say it was provoked by anti-Islamic actions in Daghestan.

2. Several explosions took place in Russia - in Moscow (2), and Volgodonsk. Some suspicions were expressed that these (or some of them) were the work of the FSB, the Russian security service, with the aim of providing a pretext for a new war. I don't know.

3. At this time, Yeltsin sacked yet another PM (Stepashin) and replaced him with - Putin.

And so another war was launched. There was speculation - and more than speculation - that this war was politically useful to the Russian leadership.

Putin's Russia, by Lilia Shevtsova, published by the Carnegie Endowment in 2003, pointed out that the second war coincided with political difficulties and scandals in Russia, and that war was a great political lift for Putin.

This second war was conducted in an even more determined way.

1. The media was more stifled - to report from the Chechen side was regarded as treachery. Civilian massacres and Chechen resistance were glossed over.

2. The military operations were conducted somewhat differently, with the aim being to reduce cities, towns and villages to rubble before sending in troops. Alexander Zhilin, a military journalist who seemed to speak for the army, was quoted as saying: "Send in men only once you've levelled everything."

General Gennadi Troshev: "Our strategy is simple. If they shoot at us from a house, we destroy the house. If they shoot at us from all over a village, we destroy the village."

I do not know how many people were killed in the second war. There are many stories of massacres. For instance, after the war, Andrew Meier, a former journalist with Time magazine, and a Russian speaker published a book called Black Earth. He describes a visit to a small village called Aldy, where he confirmed that Russian forces had entered the village and shot some 60 people out of hand.

3. The international media did not have much to say about the war either. Also silent were leaders of Western nations who, it would seem, wanted to keep Putin on side.

The only squeak I heard from the West came when the US Administration complained about a few bombs being dropped over the border in Georgia.

After Grozny had been reduced to rubble, when villages were still being raided and looted by Russian forces, Radio Free Europe (based in Prague) ceased its Chechen language broadcasts. This was widely interpreted as a green light to Putin.

By Feb. 2000, Grozny had been captured and direct rule from Moscow had been established.

Since the war "ended", violence has continued on both sides. I commenced this talk by outlining some of them. I add that the Russian human rights organisation Memorial (all power to them for speaking out in very difficult circumstances) estimates that since the war "ended" in 1999, some 3000 innocent people have been "disappeared" in Chechnya.

What of the future? What is the solution? The short answer is that I do not know. I find it hard to be optimistic - the events of the past may have created an intractable situation of lose-lose.

However, it seems to me that if there is to be any reasonable solution, it will take a long time to come to fruition, it will require an agreement that Chechnya have at least a large degree of autonomy if not independence, and that they will need a lot of help.

A great deal will depend on those Chechens and their leaders who are not blinded by the desire for revenge, but who see the need for a negotiated solution. The main leader in this category is Aslan Maskhadov who has fought for independence, but who keeps on offering to negotiate.

Putin seems to have rejected any idea of negotiation. Indeed, to listen to him, you sometimes would not think that the issue was Chechnya at all, but the international war on terror - the same one being fought by George Bush and Co.

Two trends have become evident in recent times.

One is that the Russian Government seems to be pursuing a policy of "Chechenising" the conflict. (Shades of the US Govt. and its "Vietnamisation" of the Vietnam war.)
That is, the Russian govt. is aiming to install Chechen leaders loyal to Moscow.

This policy faces many problems. One is that it requires fake elections. Another is that Chechen leaders prepared to be loyal to Moscow include people with their own private armies based on clans, people who have been involved in atrocities and corruption. In addition, any leader is in danger of assassination, .e.g. in May 2004, the President backed by Putin, Akhmad Kadyrov, was assassinated.

While pursuing this policy of Chechenisation, the Russian government does not seem to be devoting any real resources to aid Chechnya to rebuild. According to the commentators I have read, Russian state budgets have not done so.

Another trend on the Chechen side which I have mentioned is that more people and leaders seem to be pursuing the policy of "Carrying the war into Russia" and extracting revenge. This trend is boosted by a number of factors, including international support from extremist Islamist terrorist groups who now have a more receptive audience, and the assassination of those pro-independence Chechen leaders who wanted independence but who could conceivably come to an agreement with Moscow.

Early this year, a car bomb killed a former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in the Gulf state of Qatar. Two Russian secret service agents were arrested.

Violence continues, all kinds of allegations are made, e.g. that Chechens have been recruited to al Qaeda (which does not surprise me), that many Chechen widows have formed a group called The Black Widows which has vowed to take revenge by terror attacks against Russia.

It is a little too soon to fully analyse the events in Beslan - all the facts have not yet come out. However, it would seem that not only Chechens were involved - perhaps some Ingush and others.

Another factor in the violence is the prevalence of corruption in Russia. This enables Chechen guerrillas to buy arms, including from Russian soldiers, many of whom are poorly paid or not paid. In May 1995 a group of 150 Chechens led by Shamil Basayev was able to purchase some trucks and travel a fair way into Russia to Budyonnovsk by bribing troops at road blocks.

The troops manning the many road blocks thought the trucks were filled with loot obtained by kontrakniki - Russian professional soldiers. Reports suggest Basayev had about $25,000, and one of the Chechens is quoted as saying that they could have got as far as Moscow if their money had not run out. In Budyonnovsk they occupied a hospital and held 2000 patients as hostages. Chernomyrdin was PM at the time, and Yeltsin was overseas. There were 142 civilian deaths, and 14 Chechen dead out of 150.

Increasing pressure on the Russian media makes it harder for those who want to recognise Chechen rights and expose atrocities inflicted on the Chechens.

The Chechens are but one case study in terrorism, and do not exhaust the subject. Indeed, I have left a lot out, and made some generalisations which really should be qualified if I had more time.

I conclude by asking these questions:

1. Should we be astonished when people who are oppressed, insulted and humiliated, subjected to all manner of injustice and who are denied any reasonable perspective for the future produce some who turn to irrational actions, blind violence, terrorism ?

This applies to many instances where small nations have long been oppressed by large nations.

2. In condemning terrorism should we not be consistent and condemn all violence against innocent people including cases where people in uniform carry out the violence? Should we make exceptions and excuse or ignore those from whom we seek some kind of short-term, narrow-minded or misguided advantage?

Allow me to conclude with another quote, again from a Russian, this time the Decembrist Mikhail Orlov in 1825: "It is just as hard to subjugate the Chechens and other peoples of this region as to level the Caucasian range. This is something to achieve not with bayonets but with time and enlightenment."

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