

FAILED AND VULNERABLE STATES
Towards a Political Science of South Pacific Regionalism

Inaugural Lecture, 30 April 2004

Allan Patience
Professor of Political Science
The University of Papua New Guinea

Introduction

Pro-Chancellor, Acting Vice Chancellor, Executive Dean, Distinguished Guests, Colleagues, and Students:

Thank you, Pro-Chancellor, for your introduction. Almost a year ago I was honoured by the offer of appointment to the Chair of Political Science within this University. It was an invitation I accepted without a moment's hesitation. Equally, it's an honour now to be delivering this inaugural lecture, marking my formal acceptance of the appointment.

I thank you all for your attendance here this afternoon. I am especially grateful to Professor Kenneth Sumbuk, to Ms Roselyn Bauwia, and to other esteemed colleagues in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, for their very hard work in arranging this academic occasion. I am grateful, too, to the talented Creative Arts students, from the School, for their impressive contributions to the proceedings.

Sir: My memories of this University go back over thirty years. In 1973 I had the pleasure of attending Professor Donald Denoon's inaugural lecture, in this very lecture theatre. And (to prove how ancient I am) I have the dubious distinction of having been defended by the late Margaret Mead (also in this theatre) when I delivered an unimpressive paper, at a Waigani Seminar, arguing for a decentralized constitution for PNG, three years before independence.

Pro-Chancellor: There appears to be a swelling chorus outside Papua New Guinea – which is increasingly being echoed inside the country – asserting that PNG is a failed (or failing) state.¹ I want to take issue with this view for two basic reasons.

First, it's a terribly disheartening - even wounding – accusation for those Papua New Guineans and others working hard and honourably for this country today. It is particularly demoralizing for the younger generation now coming through PNG's schools and universities. I've been privileged to meet some of these young people in my UPNG classes. Their enthusiasm for learning and their commitment to their country makes me very hopeful – despite terrible resource constraints within all of PNG's schools and universities, and despite the wilful neglect of education by governments over many years. These students deserve far better than to be told that their country is a hopeless cause.

The second reason why I take issue with the failed state accusation is because I believe that it's wrong - insidiously wrong.

In this lecture I suggest that PNG is a “vulnerable state” – something altogether different to a failed state. And I believe that while the going may be tough at the moment, the sky won't necessarily fall in. There are ways out of the current dilemmas confronting this well endowed and potentially successful country. They involve thinking politically, in the very best sense of that ambiguous term - painting big political pictures, and dreaming great political dreams. These are not times for weak politics, for faint hearts, for corrupted consciences, for small minds, and for leaders driven by narrow self-interest. Almost a century ago, the great German scholar Max Weber warned us that “Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective”.²

We need a new generation of inspirational leaders in PNG's public life – leaders with both passion and perspective. They will need the moral grounding of a Nelson Mandela and a Mahatma Gandhi, of an Aung San Suu Kyi and a Mother Teresa. *They* are leaders whose sole purpose was, and is, to serve their peoples, to lift them up, to inspire and educate them, to bring them justice and freedom, to nurture their inherent dignity as fellow human beings and fellow citizens. And this new generation needs a

good grounding in the systematic study of politics. For, as Michael Oakeshott said, in an inaugural lecture in the University of London, “The fruits of political education will appear in the manner in which we think and speak about politics and perhaps the manner in which we conduct our political activities”.³

Pro-Chancellor: *If* we’re going to educate the emerging leadership well in this country, *if* we are to teach how to think and speak intelligently and ethically about politics, *if* we are to research and analyse political activities within PNG and of relevance to this country, we need *a world-class university* that offers its students vibrant theoretical and professional curricula that are equal to the very best international academic standards. We have to *educate* our students *up*, to show them there is a whole world outside, and more, to be understood. We must not talk down to them patronizingly, simply *training* them to be “work ready”. We have to combine theory and practice richly, providing not a pedagogy of the oppressed, but a curriculum for independent, critical, resourceful, and public-spirited, free citizens.

The task of this University, and the political science teaching we offer within it, is to be a mediator between customary PNG wisdoms and understandings and international knowledge and ideas. UPNG has to be a place where dialogues are continually taking place, between PNG scholars and scholars all round the world, ensuring that PNG is taken seriously, as an intellectually up-to-date country in a rapidly globalizing world. To fail to deliver this would be to vandalize the life-chances of the current generation of young PNG scholars, and to do untold damage to the lives of generations yet to come.

II

My first proposition is that the accusation that PNG is a failed state is a clear example of blaming the victim. It permits certain smug and self-righteous Australian commentators - like Professor Helen Hughes for example - to paint PNG’s systems of governance as being riddled with corruption, as being incapable of delivering reasonable levels of service to the people, as being indifferent to appalling collapses in law and order, as being unable to guarantee the security of the country, and as being hostile to the kind of civil society that would nurture a robust democracy in this land.⁴

Sir, I believe there are two major objections to this prejudice.

First, it conveniently glosses over the ham-fisted decolonization that Australia forced on PNG nearly 30 years ago. It also keeps cunningly hidden from view the neglect with which Australia treated the whole of the South Pacific since the 1970s, until the horrifying events of 9/11 (2001) in the United States scared the Howard government into reacting against Australia's hitherto languid posture towards the region. The undue haste and unjustifiable comprehensiveness of Australia's withdrawal in 1976 - leaving PNG without the levels of infrastructure, capacity, and capacity-building necessary for a smooth transition to independence - needs urgent re-evaluation. And this re-evaluation should be brought right to the very centre of the contemporary debates about governance in PNG.

To put it bluntly: I'm suggesting that Australia's incompetent and unconscionable decolonization of PNG is a major cause of governance failures in this country over the past three decades. Unquestionably, it is the case that there *have* been massive and disastrous governance failures. And they have been made worse by some particularly venal and corrupt leaders.

The grim fact is (as Sean Dorney, I believe, has pointed out), *there never was a real, functioning "state" capable of taking over in PNG once Australia withdrew*. If there was no substantive state structure within which modern governance could take firm root, how could we possibly expect things to be different in PNG today? Young PNG scholars have every right to demand to know who's kidding whom when the Helen Hughes of this world start pointing fingers and shouting accusations about failing states.

It is the *absent* state that is the problem - and the prime cause of that absence is a characteristically short-sighted, miserably pragmatic Australian colonialism.

If the claim about the inadequacy of Australia's decolonizing strategies back in the 1970s - and earlier - is true, there is a lot for which Australia must answer. It places on the former colonial power a profound moral obligation *to re-engage intelligently and sensitively* with PNG, in order to remedy the situation before it's too late. Intelligence and sensitivity were in short supply prior to, and during, the 1970s. And it's not just the hasty, Whitlamesque decolonization strategies that need a thorough-going

(preferably Papua New Guinean-led) critique, but the whole miserable, lacklustre, complacent, lazy, ineffectual colonial period itself - right from the beginnings in the 1880s, through to the 1970s. This critique should focus especially on the post Pacific War years – e.g., on the insensitive paternalism of the Hasluck years, the sheer ignorance of the Barnes years, and the Whitlam-like hastiness of the Peacock years.

There is a corollary to this urgently needed critique of the colonial and decolonization periods. This has to do with the profound obligation that a re-evaluation of Australia’s colonial record places squarely on the shoulders of PNG’s contemporary leaders. In the light of such a critique they must negotiate - with a wisdom that has not been always obvious, and with a vision for the future which (let’s be frank) is still lacking - a root and branch renewal of appropriate levels of Australian assistance in ways that will ensure all the peoples of PNG are its beneficiaries, not just a few of the governing elite in Waigani or in other salubrious places around the land. This means avoiding the populist trap of reacting negatively, or with hostility, to proactive proposals for rethinking Australian assistance.

Pro-Chancellor: It’s time to take an entirely new approach to enhanced engagement, to move into a creative and mutually respectful partnership between the two countries, PNG and Australia. We must avoid at all costs what we can usefully describe as the “Luther Wenge Reaction”.⁵

That kind of populism is a terrible danger to PNG on three grounds:

- (i) It lends weight to misleading (and highly manipulative) accusations of governance failure
- (ii) It is frighteningly ignorant of the *Realpolitik* of Australia’s most recent change of direction in the South Pacific
- (iii) It shifts attention away from the real needs of PNG at this time - needs that Australia should be addressing comprehensively, but which it will address only cosmetically if it can get away with it

The second reason for rejecting the branding of PNG as a failed state is because it permits its accusers to wriggle off the hook when it comes to serious governance weaknesses and failings in their own back yards. I shall have more to say about this later – but think for a moment of the terrible conditions facing Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in contemporary Australia, conditions that have all the hallmarks of a state that persistently – criminally - fails these peoples.⁶

I note, in passing, that the Foundation Professor of Political Studies in this University, the late Professor Charles Rowley, was one of the great advocates of the Australian Aborigines. His three-volume account of the destruction of Aboriginal society remains a classic reminder of the continuing failures of governments at all levels in contemporary Australia to address the plight of Australia's First Peoples.⁷ It is a humbling experience to find myself occupying the Chair that Professor Rowley initiated; it would be a fitting memorial to that dignified and gentle scholar to name the chair after him.

May I also recall that Professor Rowley was well aware of the shortcomings of Australia's colonialism in this country. His two excellent books, *The New Guinea Villager* and *The Australians in German New Guinea*, are scholarly critiques of colonial intrusions in this land that were humdrum at best, frequently intellectually irresponsible, and, at worst, ethically contemptible. My critical remarks about this system are a pale reflection of Professor Rowley's more cautious and less condemnatory scholarship – I recommend his writings to young Papua New Guineas today.⁸

III

Before I proceed with my central argument, I want to highlight an important distinction that we need, repeatedly, to be reminded of – i.e., the distinction between *politics* and *political science*. It is a distinction the Professor Rowley upheld with integrity throughout the period leading up to independence, and immediately afterwards, when it would have been easy for an ambitious academic to play an activist role in the politics of the newly independent state. Charles Rowley's example

was followed by his successors: Professors John Ballard, Rex Mortimer, Peter King, and Yaw Saffu. All of these people brought sagacity and scholarship to the teaching *about* politics in this place. It is with a deep sense of humility that I follow in their footsteps: I salute them all, the living and the dead, and honour them for their fine contributions to the University of PNG and the development of a post-independent Papua New Guinea.

We political scientists are most useful when we step back from political action in order to engage in political reflection – i.e., in the first instance, we’re thinkers rather than doers. We’re noted more for our dispassion than our passion, for our cautious, rather than what Professor Lilla calls “reckless”, minds.⁹ *As political scientists*, we rarely take sides in the prevailing political debates because, ideally, we are committed to understanding the arguments of *all* the protagonists, rather than promoting the cause of one side or the other. We may sympathize with *your* side, but we can see the justice in *their* side too. You will have to forgive us if we seem like a bunch of fence sitters - but, as such, we have our uses as we urge partial and partisan points of view to accommodate each other, to listen to each other, to compromise when compromise will lessen conflict, to synthesize when synthesis will bring progress. This, after all, is the very art of politics itself – reconciling the irreconcilable, managing the unmanageable, and balancing the public good and the private good.

This is not to say that academic political scientists are without their own politics. We do have our own preferences, our own values, and these shape our interpretative approaches to the discipline. It is therefore vital that we always declare our values at the outset of any analysis we proffer, to enable our audiences – our students, our readers, the wider public – to know exactly where we’re coming from. To try to hide our values is to be disingenuous. And to pretend we are value free – or, worse, to *believe* we are so – is to be unscholarly in the extreme.¹⁰

Pro-Chancellor: At UPNG we political scientists have no particular political barrow to push, no political axe to grind, no politically correct line to follow. My colleagues and I – Drs Sepoe, Okole, and Gelu - are unequivocally committed to the ideals of human dignity, the values of freedom and democracy, and what the great contemporary Canadian political theorist Charles Taylor calls the “politics of recognition”.¹¹ To borrow Dr Sepoe’s words, we respect diversity and difference. But we expect our

students to work out their own politics for themselves, at an intellectual level, by debating with the great thinkers in the field of political science scholarship, as we introduce and interpret them in our classes. One of our great hopes is that some of our graduates will become political leaders, that some will become wise and ethical public servants, that some will become astute policy advisers and insightful political commentators in the media, that some will become outstanding community leaders.

But our over-riding expectation is that they will *all* become good citizens. We have no doubt that the systematic study of political science is one way of achieving that civilizing ideal.

IV

The centrality of the state in mainstream political science discourse is one of its distinguishing features. This is not to say that the state always has been, and always will be, the apparent reality that we so often take it to be.

One of the greatest worries about a great deal of modern political science has been its obsession with empirical facts at the expense of historical and philosophical analysis. This has led to a realist consensus in contemporary political science that the state will endure - that it is *the* irreducible “given” in politics everywhere. In International Relations - perhaps the most high profile sub-field within political science - what is referred to as the states system (i.e., a paradigmatic agreement amounting almost to a scientific law that says states are always and everywhere *the* predominant actors in world politics) remains the lodestar in most modern political science. As one of the towering big men in modern IR theory puts it: “The states system has always operated within a wider system of political interaction, and within the world-wide political system of today, the primacy of the states system is for the time being assured”.¹²

V

Well, I ask, *is* it assured in the context of the globalizing world in which we live today? Is the confidence with which Professor Bull wrote those words nearly thirty years ago justified today? In response to these questions, I want briefly to sketch a case that dissents from the widespread assumption in my discipline about the inviolability and inevitability of states.

For most of us, I suspect, the ideal modern state is a democratic ideal. And attached to this very attractive vision is the idea of sovereign independence. We think of the modern state having some or all of the following: an advanced separation of powers, a constitution, a bill of rights, fair and regular elections, secret ballots, a free media, a “loyal opposition”, freedoms of speech, assembly, worship, etc. And the over-riding feature of this ideal modern democratic state is its nurturing of participation by a wide cross-section of people – through associations like political parties, the media, lobby groups, social movements, trade unions, employers’ groups, churches, educational institutions, and so on - in making the important policy decisions that will affect their lives.

We also see this state acting with dignity in world affairs, respected by other states, large and small, free to make its own laws and govern its citizens without interference from outside.

VI

So much for the ideal; what of the reality?

For a long time now political sociologists have been warning that the modern state has been heading in anything but democratic directions. The evidence is overwhelming: *all* modern states are increasingly dominated by ruling oligarchies; they are becoming less, not more democratic. It shows that voters are becoming increasingly alienated from their political institutions and from their political leaders. It was Karl Marx who warned us, well over a century ago, that the modern state would end up as nothing more than an executive committee for managing the common affairs of the ruling class. Over half a century ago the highly respected American social scientist, C. Wright Mills, identified what he described as a “power elite” dominating US politics and working principally in the interests of what he described as a “military industrial complex”.¹³ Some thirty years ago, the eminent British political scientist Ralph Miliband, in his path-breaking study *The State in Capitalist Society*, showed us how narrowly concentrated the instruments of state power were in the hands of a very small group of politicians, bureaucrats and business figures in modern Britain and

other developed states – states that are intensifying their corporatist structuring and becoming remote from the peoples they should serve.¹⁴

In recent decades we have seen a comprehensive attack on the role and function of the modern state being conducted in the name of “economic rationalism”. This is a neo-liberal ideology that has sought to reduce the intervention of the state in civil society and the economy by demanding high levels of deregulation, the comprehensive privatisation of public enterprise, the lowering of taxes, and the dismantling of large parts of the welfare state and its associated activities (e.g., public education, public health, public transport).¹⁵ This attack on the state assumes that there is a civil society – a rich civil society – out there waiting to take up the previous functions of the state, even in areas as arcane as charitable work. It is based on a deep cynicism about the state, about its corruptibility, its inefficiency and its immunity from the disciplining rigours of the free market.

But we ought to know by now that the rich are rarely generous when it comes to a social conscience – how else could they be rich? Where economic rationalism has taken hold of modern states – as it has done with a virulence that was unexpected among many political scientists – the rich have been less than obviously active in any civil society arrangements; but they have been getting richer and simultaneously the poor have been getting poorer. And their efforts have undermined the interventionist and regulatory capacities of modern states to provide social justice and promote social development.

More recent research highlights growing evidence of a widening gap between developed state hierarchies and their electors and citizens. For example, in their detailed surveys of citizens’ attitudes to politicians and public policy making in the contemporary United States, Professors Hibbing and Theiss-Morse show that large majorities of voters want nothing to do with politics or politicians. They feel shut out of their major political institutions, they believe they are not listened to by their political leaders, they think that politicians have become selfish careerists feathering their own nest at the expense of ordinary folk. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse even note significant majorities of voters would prefer to hand government over to what they describe as “non-self-interested elites”, technocrats and similar experts. They would prefer this “in a minute” to leaving it all in the hands of conventionally elected

political representatives. As these authors note in their recent book, *Stealth Democracy*:

The people do not care at all about most public policies and do not want to be more involved in the political process [...] The people prefer a process that allows them to keep politics at arms length [...] their ideal system is one in which they themselves are not involved, but where they can be confident that decision makers will be motivated by a desire to serve the people.¹⁶

What I'm suggesting is that the modern state is not *ipso facto* a democratic state. It is fundamentally a corporatist state, turning a blind eye to growing inequalities and permitting big men (it's rarely women) in business, politics, and the civil service to use its resources for their own selfish advantage, at terrible expense to the people they allegedly govern - but whom in fact they exploit and destroy.

VII

What of sovereignty? Historians and political scientists tend to agree that the modern state emerged from the various activities we lump under the ambiguous title of the Peace (or Treaty) of Westphalia, bringing to an end some three decades of war in Europe from 1618-1648. The states system that came into being following this exercise in high diplomacy is noteworthy not the least for the theory – or maybe we should call it an ideology - of sovereignty that it enshrined in modern international politics. This theory is rooted in European cultural and religious, largely Protestant, religious traditions and has always assumed a relatively homogenous socio-political character for the state, or one where peoples who are deemed to be marginal* have been pacified and are expected to be compliant with the ruling authorities.¹⁷ Despite these rather constraining limitations, it has nonetheless spread around the world, often ending up in contexts that are utterly foreign to its origins, structures, and purposes.

Like many ideologies it is persuasively attractive; but in practice sovereignty is more an illusion than it is a reality in modern politics. Professor Stephen Krasner rather pointedly refers to it as “organized hypocrisy”: “The basic principles of Westphalian

* The language often used in relation to these peoples is almost Hegelian at times; it includes terms like “backward”, “primitive”, and “undeveloped”. It is language that is inherently oppressive and dangerously misleading.

sovereignty, the autonomy of domestic structures, has frequently been compromised through intervention in the form of coercion or imposition by more powerful states, or through intervention in the form of contracts or conventions that have involved invitations for external actors to influence domestic authority structures.”¹⁸ (A vivid example of this influencing of domestic political authority is bribery of officials by external interests – corruption – that ruthlessly white ants state sovereignty. No state run by corrupted officials is a sovereign state. Whatever sovereignty it may have been able to lay claim to has been debauched by its corrupt leaders.)

In short, the modern advanced state appears to be a failure when it comes to guaranteeing sovereignty and nurturing participatory democratic institutions, processes and personalities. We could point to many related failings e.g., the relentless growth of socio-economic inequalities (e.g., homelessness in the USA), the continuing oppression of women and marginalization of other gender minorities, racist exclusions of ethnic minorities from mainstream social institutions and structures, the neglect of old people, decreasing access to adequate health care services.

VIII

Related to its inadequacies in maintaining sovereignty, the modern state is also now under real challenge at international levels. Globalization is bringing both threats and challenges to confront the modern state. Multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational corporations (TNCs) have mushroomed over recent decades, growing across state boundaries and delivering annual budgets and growth that rival or outpace most states. Consider, for example, that three individual stockholders in Microsoft Corporation own more capital than all the peoples of Africa together.¹⁹ These corporative mega-giants are often working closely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and similar private bodies to maximize their profits while exploiting cheap resources and cheap labour and easily manipulated markets in small states right round the globe.

The result has been a massive growth in global inequality. Today, as a consequence, 40,000 children die everyday around the world from diseases related to malnutrition and three billion people are forced to subsist on less than two dollars per day.²⁰ At the same time 80% of the world's food and energy resources are being consumed by less than 20% of the world's population – in the rich parts of the world. This sort of inequality, which Princeton's Professor Richard Falk refers to as “predatory globalization”, is getting worse as the negative forces of globalization prosper.²¹

And they succeed routinely by ignoring the ideals of democratic sovereignty naively held to by small, newly independent states that are justly proud of what they think of as their independence when what it really is, is a new form of dependence.

Or it is a form of vulnerability as big powerful states do what they always have done – ride roughshod over any smaller states that get in their way or are deemed to be useful to them.

IX

But there is an upside to globalization. This comes from the growth of what scholars like Professor John Keane refer to as the emergence of “global civil society”.²² We see this very promising development in the spread of globalized information network (especially via the Internet), the growing influence of international movements like Greenpeace and the women's movement, the rapid increase in global human rights advocacy, and even the institution of an International Criminal Court, based in the Hague in the Netherlands, designed to hear cases against leaders accused of crimes against humanity. This growth of a global civil society goes ways beyond the modern imagining of the sovereign state.²³ It points to the evolution of larger regional associations of states that will probably be the foundation stones of a global cosmopolitan democracy and some kind of global governance.

X

What does all this mean for states like PNG in the South Pacific?

The failings of modern states – failings that beset *all* modern states, not just states like the Solomon Islands, or Tonga, or Zimbabwe – and the challenges of globalization impose on us the urgent need to think about a post-state world. If, as I have been suggesting, modern states have reached their use-by dates, what do we try to put in their place? Clearly political science has a role to play in guiding the scholarship that will underpin the theorising and implementing of post-state international politics.

What will a post-state world be like?

This is an important question for states like PNG. All the post-World War II newly independent states, right up to Fiji and PNG, and more recently in East Timor, are all colonially contrived political arrangements. The territories and administrative structures they have inherited are nearly all mimics of what existed during colonial times. It was assumed that decolonization would automatically be the midwife of a new modern state, and that this would grow into a lusty sovereign state able to stand on its own feet and govern itself efficiently and honourably.

It is hard to see where this expectation has actually happened in any post-colonial states around the world. They have pretty well *all* ended up as “vulnerable states” – states without the levels of infrastructure and cultural legitimacy absolutely necessary for good governance. May it not be that this is precisely because the inherited state that we find in most post-colonial settings – *nearly always a caricature of the post-Westphalian modern state* – is an utterly inappropriate state system for the post-colonial conditions that it is confronted by? I think so. And given that the modern state itself is failing so seriously in its original modern settings, how could we expect things to be other than they are in places like contemporary PNG.

XI

What, then, is to be done?

If countries like PNG and its South Pacific neighbours are going to weather the storms of “predatory globalization”, they will need to give up their modern state fantasies and re-imagine a new system of governance – perhaps we could call it a “Melanesian State”, or “South Pacific Governance”. What I am saying, in short, is that a new form

of governance has to be imagined into being. There is no reason why scholars in PNG should not be at the forefront of this development. It will have to be a state that can move on from obsessions with sovereignty in order to achieve a high degree of regional integration.

Whether this means planning for a Southwest Pacific Union – e.g., a Southwest Pacific Confederation – with its own *confederal* constitution, sharing a wide range of resources and institutional arrangements has to be worked out by people in the region itself. Already this has begun with the Pacific Forum Secretariat recently agreeing to develop an integrated approach to security in the region.²⁴ Should this be expanded? For example, should there be a regional airline and transport system? Should there be a regional health system, to combat pandemics like HIV/AIDS, SARS and TB? Should there be an integrated currency system for the region? Should there be a confederal university, bringing the resources of all the regional universities together to produce graduates who will not only serve their own peoples, but become global citizens, shaping the future of the entire globe?

These are vast questions and it would be impudent of me to start telling PNG what to do. What I can do - along with my academic colleagues in this University - is to continue asking questions and to continue teaching students to think rigorously, critically, and adventurously, about their country, about the region, and about the contemporary globalizing world in which PNG is placed.

Pro-Chancellor: I commit myself to doing this as well as I possibly can, in the time that I am here at UPNG.

ENDNOTES

Two external examples: Elsin Wainwright, “Responding to State Failure – The Case of the Solomon Islands”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 3, November 2003; Mark Dodd, “Problems Persist in Paradise”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 March 2004. In her conclusion Wainwright draws attention to South Pacific states other than SI that may attract Australian intervention - for example: “PNG continues to experience law and order and governance problems. There is a significant amount of violence in Port Moresby and in the Southern Highlands, and there is a significant glorification of guns and gun culture. The economy continues to stagnate, governance is weak, corruption is rife, and there has been a significant increase in HIV infections...” (p. 496). Dodd writes about “... rampant corruption and endemic crime [that] are symptomatic of the lawlessness that has long plagued Papua New Guinea, leaving locals traumatized, foreigners closeted in fortified compounds and the country’s economy and infrastructure in a mess”. For a more colourful version of this position see Susan Windybank and Mike Manning, “Papua New Guinea on the Brink”, *Issue Analysis*, (Sydney: CIS), No. 30, 12 March 200. See also R.J. May, *Disorderly Democracy: Political Turbulence and Institutional Reform in Papua New Guinea*, Discussion Paper 2003/3, Canberra: State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU; Hengene Payani, “Bureaucratic Corruption in Papua New Guinea: Causes, Consequences and Remedies,” in David Kavanamur et al. (eds.), *Building a Nation in Papua New Guinea: Views of the Post-Independence Generation*, Canberra: Pandanus Press, 2003; David Lea, “The Ethics of Corruption in Papua New Guinea and Elsewhere in the Developing World”, *South Pacific Journal of Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 3, 1998-99; Henry Okole and David Kavanamur, “Political Corruption in Papua New Guinea: Some Causes and Policy Lessons”, *South Pacific Journal of Philosophy and Culture*, Vol. 7, 2003.

² Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 128.

³ Michael Oakeshott, “Political Education”, in his *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*, Philadelphia: LibertyPress, 1991, p. 66.

⁴ See, e.g., Helen Hughes, *Aid and the Pacific*, Sydney: CIS, 2003; Helen Hughes, “Outlook for PNG Remains Bleak”, *The Canberra Times*, 1 April 2004. See also Peter Bauer et al., *Aid and Development in the South Pacific*, Sydney: CIS, 2003.

⁵ To get the flavour of what I am referring to, see “Wenge: Throw Out Australians”, *The National*, 2 March, 2004; “Wenge Persists with Anti-Aussie Stance”, *PNG Post-Courier*, 9 March 2004; “Wenge Replies to his Critics”, *The National*, 10 March, 2004;

⁶ For example, see the report of a recent Canadian study that utilized the United Nations’ index of human development of Indigenous peoples. The study found that Australian Aborigines have the *worst* measures of educational attainment, life expectancy, and that they suffer the worst income gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in the world. See Andrea Jackson, “Life of Aborigines Second Worst on Earth”, *The Age*, 28 April 2004.

⁷ Charles Rowley, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society* (Vol. 1: Aboriginal Policy and Practice), Canberra: ANUP, 1970; *Outcasts in White Australia* (Vol. II: Aboriginal Policy and Practice), Canberra: ANUP, 1971; *The Remote Aborigines* (Vol. III: Aboriginal Policy and Practice), Canberra: ANUP, 1971.

⁸ Charles Rowley, *The New Guinea Villager*, Melbourne: Cheshire, 1965; *The Australians in German New Guinea, 1914-1921*, Melbourne: MUP, 1958.

⁹ Mark Lilla, *The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics*, New York: NYRBB, 2001.

¹⁰ This is brilliantly elaborated in Hugh Stretton, *The Political Sciences*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

¹¹ Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993.

¹² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, second edition, New York: Columbia UP, 1995, p. 271.

¹³ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York: OUP, 1960.

¹⁴ Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.

¹⁵ In Australia this development has been usefully described – from opposing points of view - in the following: Michael Pewsey, *Economic Rationalism and Canberra*, Cambridge: CUP, 1990; Paul Kelly, *The End of Certainty*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992.

- ¹⁶ John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: American Beliefs about How Government Should Work*, Cambridge: CUP, 2002, p. 227.
- ¹⁷ See, e.g., Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.
- ¹⁸ Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999, p. 220. See also John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, 2001.
- ¹⁹ Fred R. Dallmayr, "Globalization and Inequality", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002, p. 145, f.n. 14.
- ²⁰ Dariusz Rosati, "The Limits of Openness", in Isabelle Grunberg and Sarbuland Khan (eds.), *Globalization: The United Nations Development Dialogue*, Tokyo: UNUP, 2000, p. 157.
- ²¹ Richard Falk, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
- ²² John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* Cambridge: CUP, 2003. See also Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An End to War*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003; Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, New Haven: Yale UP, 2002; Alejandro Colas, *International Civil Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.
- ²³ See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.
- ²⁴ See Eminent Persons' Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, *Pacific Cooperation: Voices of the Region*, Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, April 2004.